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SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
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Appellant, Shawn Coleman, was found guilty by a jury of being a convicted 
felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 18 
U.S.C. § 2.  Coleman appeals his conviction and argues that the District Court 
erred by: (1) denying his suppression motion; (2) failing to order a new trial to 
remedy a Brady violation;
1
 and (3) using a jury instruction to cure an instance of 
prosecutorial vouching instead of declaring a mistrial.  For the reasons that follow, 
we will affirm.  
I. 
 At about 2:00 AM on November 5, 2009, the Lindenwold, New Jersey 
Police Department received a telephone call from a resident of an apartment 
complex complaining that an unknown vehicle’s bright lights were shining into the 
resident’s apartment unit.  Officers Arthur Hall and George Przybylski responded 
to the call and found the vehicle running with its high beams on and the radio 
playing loudly.  The officers observed Coleman in the front seat of the vehicle 
either asleep or unconscious.  The officers’ attempts to rouse Coleman were 
unsuccessful.  Because they were concerned about Coleman’s unresponsiveness, 
they checked and discovered the doors were unlocked.  Officer Przybylski opened 
the driver’s door and shook Coleman to no avail.  Officer Hall, standing on the 
                                                                                                                                                             

 The Honorable Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, sitting by designation. 
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  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963). 
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passenger side of the car, reached over to turn off the car’s engine and to check 
Coleman’s pulse. While reaching across the car, Hall observed a firearm sticking 
out of the car’s center console. Officer Przybylski took Coleman from the vehicle 
and Officer Hall secured the firearm.  Coleman regained consciousness, after 
which Officer Przybylski placed him in handcuffs.  Officer Hall asked him why he 
was carrying the gun and whether he was an off-duty officer or someone else 
permitted to carry a gun.  Coleman responded that the gun was for his protection.   
 The officers placed Coleman in Przybylski’s patrol car.  Przybylski advised 
Coleman that he was being detained for the firearm but did not administer Miranda 
warnings at the time.
2
  While driving to the police station, Przybylski was listening 
to the radio.  After a report that the New York Yankees had lost a World Series 
Game to the Philadelphia Phillies, Coleman stated words to the effect that he was 
“having a bad night, his Yankees lost and he shouldn’t have left the gun in the 
open like that.”  A87. 
 At the police station, Officer Przybylski advised Coleman of his Miranda 
rights and Coleman executed the Miranda Warnings form.  Coleman indicated that 
he understood his rights and invoked his right to remain silent.  While being 
fingerprinted a few minutes later, Coleman spontaneously stated: “I can’t believe I 
left the gun there. I’m not having a good night. The Yankees lost and now this.”  
                                                 
2
 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-72 (1966). 
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A132.  Przybylski reminded Coleman that he had previously exercised his right to 
remain silent and asked whether he wanted to speak with the officers.  Coleman 
declined and said nothing more.  
After Coleman was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm, he 
moved to suppress his statements and the firearm.  The Government opposed the 
motion but noted that it would not offer Coleman’s statement at the scene, which 
was uttered while Coleman was handcuffed and before he was administered the 
Miranda warnings.  
After a hearing and supplemental briefing by Coleman and the Government, 
the District Court granted in part and denied in part Coleman’s suppression motion. 
The District Court ruled: (1) that the officers’ warrantless entry into Coleman’s car 
fell within the public safety exception to the Fourth Amendment; (2) that the 
firearm found at the scene was legally seized under the plain view exception to the 
Fourth Amendment; (3) that Coleman’s first statement did not satisfy the public 
safety exception to Miranda and was inadmissible; and (4) that the Miranda 
violation did not taint Coleman’s subsequent two statements because those 
statements were uttered voluntarily and spontaneously. 
A jury found Coleman guilty as charged.  
II. 




The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
“We review the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress for clear 
error as to the underlying facts, but exercise plenary review as to its legality in 
light of the court’s properly found facts.” United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 
999 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  We apply this 
same standard of review to Coleman’s Brady claim, which “presents questions of 
law as well as questions of fact[.]”  United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 969 
(3d Cir. 1991).  Because Coleman objected to the line of questioning that he 
contends impermissibly vouched for Officer Przybylski’s credibility, we review for 
an abuse of discretion and harmless error.  United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314, 
325 (3d Cir. 2007).   
III. 
Coleman argues that the District Court should have suppressed his second 
and third statements, in which he admitted he had left the gun in the open.  It is 
unnecessary for us to address whether the District Court erred in admitting these 
statements because the “admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence does 
not warrant reversing a conviction where ‘the prosecution can show that the 
evidence is so overwhelming that it is beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict 
would have been the same without the improper evidence.’” United States v. 
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Shabazz, 564 F.3d 280, 286 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 
711, 720 (3d Cir.1994)).  Here, the second and third statements pertain solely to 
the element of whether Coleman knowingly possessed the firearm.  See United 
States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2000) (establishing that elements of a 
§ 922(g)(1) offense).  It is undisputed that the firearm was discovered in plain view 
beside Coleman in the center console of the car in which he was the sole occupant.  
This was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the element of possession.   
Coleman also contends that the prosecution violated its obligations under 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963), by failing to turn over statements 
that he could have used to impeach Officer Przyblyski at the suppression hearing.  
This claim lacks merit because the information, which was produced by the 
government immediately after receiving it days before trial, would not have 
impeached Officer Przybylski’s credibility because it did not relate to his character 
for truthfulness.  
Finally, Coleman asserts that he was deprived of a fair trial because the 
prosecution vouched for the credibility of Officer Przybylski during its direct 
examination of him.  Coleman objected to the question and answer he cites as 
impermissible vouching.  After hearing the parties at sidebar, the District Court 
struck the question and answer, and instructed the jury not only to disregard the 
question and answer but also to remember that they are to determine the credibility 
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of the witnesses.  Because the testimony was stricken and because the Court 
provided an appropriate instruction to the jury, there is no basis for granting relief 
for impermissible vouching.  See United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 195 (3d Cir. 
2010) (concluding relief unwarranted for vouching because, inter alia, defendant’s 
objection was sustained).   
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
